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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment, I since its enactment in 1868, has been the
cornerstone of equal protection in the school systems. 2 Under this rubric, the
courts first held that each and every citizen of the United States, including
African Americans, has a right to an equal education. 3 Shortly thereafter, under
Plessy v. Ferguson's4 "separate but equal" doctrine, the courts held that such a
right could be provided in separate yet equal facilities. 5 As a result, dual public
school systems6 were formed.
I "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. For a general study of the development of public
education prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, see R. FREEMAN BuTmh & LAWRENCE A.
CREMIN, A HISTORY oF EDUCAToN IN AMERICAN CuLTuRE Parts I and ]1 (1953).
2 The Supreme Court, in its first cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment,
interpreted it to mean that all forms of discrimination against African Americans is
unconstitutional. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-72 (1873); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), overnuled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975). Specifically, in regard to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in
Strauder stated that "[w]hat is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States.... [and] that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color?" Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313, 318 (1880), overuled by City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966)
(establishing that Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions apply to all actions of a state).
3 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Cumming v. County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
4 163 U.S. 537 (1895), overrded by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Many people assume that the Supreme Court held in Plessy that separate but equal schools
are constitutionally permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Unbeknownst to those
who have never read the actual case, Plessy did not involve public education; instead, it was
concerned with transportation. The concept of separate but equal schools was, instead,
transformed from the holding and rationales in Plessy.
5 Id. at 550-51; see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954)
[hereinafter Brown I] ("Under [the Plessy v. Ferguson] doctrine, equality of treatment is
accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these
facilities be separate."). In reality, however, the African-American schools were not
provided with the same quality of facilities, books, materials, and other resources. See, e.g.,
Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aft'd, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
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In 1954, the Supreme Court re-analyzed the "separate but equal" doctrine.
In Brown v. Board of Education,7 the Supreme Court rejected the application
of the doctrine in the area of public education and held that segregation of
children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies African-
American children the equal protection of the laws.8 By denouncing school
segregation, the Supreme Court declared the mere existence of a dual school
system a violation of the Constitution. As a result, Brown established that
public school districts have a constitutional duty to desegregate their public
schools. 9
In 1994, as race relations in the United States are supposedly "getting
better," African Americans are still faced with the problem of collecting on the
promises of Brown. Nearly forty years after that landmark decision, African
Americans are witnessing the resurrection of the dual school system. Many
school districts are becoming segregated once again, while numerous other
school districts have remained segregated. 10
How can this be? What about Brown? In 1954, the Supreme Court's
opinion focused upon remedying the form of discrimination that existed in the
(1955). In Gebhart the Supreme Court of Delaware followed the "separate but equal"
doctrine but ordered that the African-American students be admitted to the white schools
because of their superiority to the African-American schools. The inferiority of the African-
American schools were based upon inferior teacher training, higher pupil-teacher ratios,
inferior extracurricular activities, inferior facilities, and increased time and distance
involved in traveling to and from school.
6 A dual public school system exists where a single school system has schools for
African-American children, who are taught by African-American school teachers, and
schools for white children, who are taught by white school teachers.
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 Id. at 495.
9 In its sister case, the Supreme Court held that the desegregation of the school systems
must be made with "all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
10 See Eric S. Stein, Note, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE
L.J. 2003, 2003-04 (1983); see also GARY ORFmLD, PUBLIC SCHooL DESEGREGATION IN
THE UNrrED STATES, 1968-1980 (1983) (indicating that the percentage of African-American
children in predominantly African-American schools increased between 1978 and 1980);
Gerald D. Suttles, School Desegregation and the "National Community," SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION RESARcH 58 (J. Prager et al. eds., 1986) (noting that various school
districts in the South have begun to resegregate). In a 1989 study, one author stated that
"[s]egregation and differential treatment of blacks continue to be widespread in [public]
schools." Stein, supra at 2004 (quoting CoMMrrrEE ON THE STATUS OF BLACK AMEmCANS,
NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AmEmcAN SOCIETY 379
(G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds., 1989).
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South: "de jure" discrimination, I I in which segregation was either mandated or
permitted by state law. In 1994, however, African-American children are no
longer the victims of de jure discrimination. Rather, they have become the
victims of a new form of discrimination: "de facto" discrimination. 12 As a
result, a new approach to desegregation had to be designed.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education13 and Keyes v.
School District No. 1,14 the Supreme Court established how to attack de facto
segregation within the school system and receive a desegregation order. The
new focus became proving intent.
Initially, desegregation orders were limited in scope to intradistrict
remedies. 15 However, with the increase in white flight to the suburban areas
during the 1960s and 70s, plaintiffs began to request that courts include these
suburban areas in the desegregation remedy, that is, interdistrict remedies.
In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Bradley,16 first addressed the
issue of when federal courts have the equitable power to grant a desegregation
order that is interdistrict in scope. Even though the Court established a two-part
test to make such a determination, it has provided the lower courts with little
guidance on how to interpret its opinion. As a result, lower courts have no
design from which they can properly formulate evidentiary standards. Overall,
the Milliken v. Bradley opinion may have effectively prevented inner city
children from receiving the full benefits of their constitutional right to an equal
education because it has "erected formidable barriers to interdistrict school
desegregation relief." 17
11 De jure discrimination occurs when the discrimination is required or permitted by
state or federal law. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. During the 1950s, 60s and
70s, it was easier to establish a claim of racial discrimination because it took place under the
color of law. Since Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), held that such laws are unconstitutional,
it has become more difficult for plaintiffs to state a claim.
12 De facto discrimination is a form of discrimination that takes place by a
governmental body without an express right to do so. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
In other words, de facto discrimination represents all forms of discrimination that are not
authorized or required by law. Today, most, if not all, forms of discrimination by
governmental bodies are de facto discrimination.
13 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
14 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
15 An intradistrict remedy is one limited to the school district which has committed the
constitutional wrong.
16 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
17 Robert R. Harding, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School
Desegregation Remedies, 93 YALE L.J. 340, 340 (1983).
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This Comment attempts to establish a blueprint from which one can
structure a case to overcome such barriers and (1) hold their school district
liable for de facto segregation, that is, maintaining a dual school system, and
(2) receive an interdistrict desegregation order in an attempt to completely
eliminate the remaining "vestiges" of state-imposed discrimination in the public
schools.
Part II of this Comment discusses Milliken v. Bradley and its limitations on
the federal courts' scope of authority to structure equitable remedies. Part 1I
also sets forth Milliken's two-part test to determine under what circumstances a
federal district court has the authority to award an interdistrict desegregation
order as a matter of law. Part II discusses each party's burden of proof and
then sets forth the presumptions the federal courts utilize to balance the
evidentiary burdens. Finally, Part IV discusses the various factors the courts
have considered to satisfy the Milliken two-part test and suggests other factors,
including housing discrimination, that arguably should be taken into account in
the courts' analysis.
II. MLUKEN v. BRADLEY: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL COURTS'
AUTHORITY TO GRANT EQUITABLE REMEDIES
A. From Intradistrict to Interdistrict Remedies-An Overview of Bradley
v. Milliken
Prior to 1954, the only remedy that the courts provided to African-
American plaintiffs was essentially a monetary award, in the form of increases
in operational funding, improvements to current facilities, more teachers, or
new books.18 However, in 1954, the Supreme Court expanded the types of
remedies that a plaintiff could receive in school segregation cases. When the
Supreme Court denounced the "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board
of Education, desegregation (or integration) orders within a school system
became a viable and somewhat effective equitable alternative.19
Intradistrict desegregation orders became the general rule after Brown.20
However, in the 1970s, requests for interdistrict desegregation orders began to
18 The belief was that equal funding and equal facilities would be sufficient to provide
equal educational opportunities, thus satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. See supra notes 4-6.
19 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v. Montgomery
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appear.21 The courts began granting these interdistrict remedies believing that
desegregation of inner city school districts, alone, would be insufficient to
completely remove the vestiges of discrimination in the public schools.22
For example, in Bradley v. Milliken,23 the court granted an interdistrict
order to remedy desegregation within the Detroit public school system. After a
forty-one day trial, the district court held that the state had violated the
plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights on two grounds. First, the state acted
to "impede, delay and minimize racial integration in Detroit schools" by
enacting Act 48.24 Second, the state provided suburban school districts
(comprised of predominately white students) with state-supported
transportation, yet failed to provide similar transportation funds for the students
(primarily African Americans) within the Detroit city school district.25
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); Brown Il, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21 The typical interdistrict desegregation order will include an inner city school district,
whose student population, especially in large metropolitan areas, is predominantly African
American, and adjacent suburban school districts, whose student population is
predominately white.
22 See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (finding that an intradistrict remedy is not a sufficient remedy because it would
result in an "all-black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white
suburban school systems .. ").
23 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aft'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
24 Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 589. Act 48, section 12 provided in pertinent part that
"[t]he implementation of any attendance provisions for the 1970-71 school year determined by
any first class school district board shall be delayed pending the date of commencement of
functions by the first class school district boards established under the provision of this
amendatory act." Act of July 7, 1970, 1970 Mich. Pub. Acts 48 (Act 48). The district court
believed that this first sentence of section 12 was designed to prevent the implementation of
the April 7, 1970 desegregation plan originally adopted by the Detroit School Board.
Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 589. The district court also believed that the remainder of
section 12 sought to prescribe for each school in the eight districts criteria of "free choice"
(open enrollment) and "neighborhood schools" (nearest school acceptance priority) that
"had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of segregation." Id.
25 The district court also found that the state and local governments, along with private
organizations such as lending institutions, real estate associations, and brokerage firms,
established and maintained a pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit
metropolitan area. Id. at 587. However, in its final analysis, the court did not place any
emphasis on this fact. Instead, the court focused on constitutional violations of the Detroit
Board of Education (holding the State vicariously liable), Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 727 (1974), and constitutional violations of the State for (1) providing funds for the
1994]
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The district court also found that the Detroit Board of Education violated
the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting to essentially maintain a
dual school system. 26 The wrongful acts committed by the board of education
included: (1) creation and maintenance of optional attendance zones allowing
white students to escape identifiably African-American schools,27 (2) drawing
attendance zones along north-south boundary lines despite awareness that
drawing the boundary lines in an east-west direction would result in
significantly greater desegregation, 28 (3) busing African-American students to
predominately African-American schools past closer white schools with
available space, 29 and (4) building a large majority of new schools in
neighborhoods that were overwhelmingly composed of either African
Americans or whites so that they would also become primarily one-race
schools. 30
To fashion the appropriate remedy, the district court ordered the Detroit
Board of Education to submit desegregation plans for the problems existing
within the city and then ordered the state to submit plans encompassing the
entire three county metropolitan area, including eighty-five other school
districts. 31 In a subsequent hearing, the district court concluded that the
busing of white students in the suburban areas but not for the African-American students
located in the inner city and (2) enacting Act 48. Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 589.26 Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 588.
27 Id. at 587.
28 Id. at 588. The court said that the "natural and actual effect of these acts and failures
to act has been the creation and perpetuation of school segregation." Id. According to the
Board's drawing of attendance zones, no predominantly white residential area has ever been
placed into a predominantly African-American school zone. In addition, every school that
was 90% or more African American in 1960, and that was still in use in 1971, remained
90% or more African American. Finally, the percentage of Detroit's African-American
students who attended schools that were 90% or more African American increased from
66% in 1960 to 75% in 1971. Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 589. In 1971, 14 new schools were opened up within the school district. Of
these 14 schools, 11 opened were over 90% African American and one opened was over
90% white. Since 1959, the board has constructed at least 13 small primary schools with
capacities from 300 to 400 students. The district court felt that this practice "negates
opportunities to integrate, 'contains' the black population and perpetuates and compounds
segregation." Id.
31 Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 920 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The eighty-five
school districts that were to be included in the state's desegregation plans were not parties to




Detroit-only plans were insufficient to accomplish desegregation in Detroit and
ordered a metropolitan remedy. 32
On appeal, the court of appeals accepted the district court's findings of fact
and affirmed its conclusions of law. On the issue of the remedy, the court also
agreed that a metropolitan plan was the proper remedy under the circumstances
because "any less comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan
would result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by
practically all white suburban school systems." 33 The court believed that the
wrongful acts by the state could only be corrected by an interdistrict remedy. 34
B. Supreme Court's Two-Part Analysis of Interdistrict Remedies
Prior to Bradley v. Milliken, no rules or guidelines existed to determine
when an interdistrict, rather than an intradistrict, desegregation order would be
proper.35 In Milliken v. Bradley, however, the Supreme Court finally
recognized the need to establish such rules and granted certiorari to determine
the circumstances under which a federal court may grant an interdistrict
desegregation order as a matter of law. 36
To lay the groundwork for its analysis, the Supreme Court looked for
guidance in its previous decision, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education.37 In Swann, the Court recognized that the controlling principle for
32 Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732 (1974). The district court disregarded the
Detroit-only desegregation plans because it found that the best of the three plans submitted
would result in an even greater number of African-American students and, thus, further
encourage whites to abandon the city and the Detroit school system. Id.
33 Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717
(1974). The court of appeals also held that the record supported the district court's findings
and conclusions regarding the constitutional violation committed by the school board, id. at
221-38, and by the state. Id. at 239-41.
34 Id. at 249. The court of appeals did not address the issue of whether the outlying
districts could be included in the desegregation plan without a finding of a violation of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Instead, the court merely held that all the suburban school
districts which might be affected by any metropolitan-wide remedy should, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19, be made parties to the case on remand and be given an
opportunity to be heard regarding the scope and implementation of the remedy. Id. at 251-
52.
35 Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
36 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717. For an in-depth analysis of Milliken, see Nathaniel R.
Jones, Milliken v. Bradley: Brown's Troubled Journey, 61 FoRDHmAM L. REv. 49 (1992).
37 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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equitable relief is that the scope of the remedy should be determined by the
nature and extent of the constitutional violation.38
With this principle as a base, the Supreme Court set forth its two-part test
to determine when interdistrict remedies are proper as a matter of law. The
Court held that before an interdistrict desegregation order can be granted as a
matter of law, "it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional
violation within one [school] district that produces a significant segregative
effect in another [school] district." 39 The Court further opined that "it must be
shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or
of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict
segregation. "40
In its analysis of the case at hand, the Supreme Court accepted the district
court's findings of fact41 and its conclusion that both the Detroit Board of
Education and the state had violated the students' right to a unitary school
system. However, the Court held that, in light of its two-part test, granting an
interdistrict desegregation order, under these facts, was impermissible as a
matter of law.42 In their opinion the second part of the test, significant
38 Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
3 9 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court expressed two
factual situations in which it believed an interdistrict remedy would be proper: (1) when the
racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an
adjacent school district; and (2) when the school district lines have been deliberately drawn
by the state on the basis of race. Id. at 745.
40 Id. at 745 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the Supreme Court does not
require the suburban school district to have committed a constitutional violation to be
included in the remedy. All that is required is that the school district be significantly
affected. This lends credence to the argument that to hold a party liable in a school
desegregation case, there does not have to be a direct correlation between the violation and
the remedy. See infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
41 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), an appellate court may set aside the
district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. See Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 469-70 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
importance of deference to the trial judge's findings of fact, especially in cases involving
"the elimination of the more conspicuous forms of governmental ordained racial
segregation").
42 See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 747-52. The Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the
importance of local control over public education in Michigan. Under Michigan law, the
local authorities are provided with a large measure of control. Act of June 29, 1955 (School
Code of 1955), MIcH. COMp. LAws § 340, repealed by School Code of 1976, Pub. Act
1976, No. 451, MtCH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 380 (West Supp. 1993-94). Under the facts of
the case, the Court believed that an interdistrict remedy could "disrupt and alter the
structure of public education in Michigan." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742-43. The Court also
noted that interdistrict desegregation orders, through the consolidation of numerous school
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segregative effect, had not been satisfied. The Court reasoned that since the
"[d]isparate treatment of white and [African-American] students occurred
within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, ... the remedy must be
limited to that system."43
Il. ALLOCAnON OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF
Currently, there is no universal rule or set of rules which govern the
allocation of the burden of proof in Fourteenth Amendment cases. 44 The
Supreme Court has recognized that there are no "hard-and-fast standards
governing the allocation of the burden of proof. ... -45 As a result of the lack
of such standards, many courts seem to distribute the burdens of proof between
the parties according to the principles of probability, public policy, and
fairness. 46
It is well-settled law that plaintiffs have the burden of proof regarding their
cause of action. In the context of school desegregation actions today, it is the
districts into one "super" school district, would provide logistical problems (as a result of
large-scale busing) as well as financing and operating difficulties. Id. at 743.
4 3 Id. at 746. The Court also stated that this intradistrict remedy was the correct
remedy under the facts because it was designed, as all remedies should be, "to restore the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence
of such conduct." Id. According to the Supreme Court's reasoning, because African
Americans would not have been going to suburban schools in the absence of the
discrimination in Detroit, such children should not be granted the opportunity to go to such
schools. On the contrary, it is impossible to determine what position the plaintiffs would
have been in but for the wrong because their current position was caused by more than
merely school segregation. Furthermore, the Court did not take into account the effect of
state-imposed discrimination on residential patterns and school systems. It is a logical
conclusion that the injured plaintiffs (African-American students) may have been distributed
throughout the entire city (and even the suburbs) attending mixed race schools if their
parents had been allowed to choose to live in such areas and to have high paying jobs like
their white counterparts.
44 Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 653, 657 (1987).
45 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973).
4 6 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 209 ("In the context of racial segregation in public education,
the courts including this Court, have recognized a variety of situations in which 'fairness'
and 'policy' require state authorities to bear the burden of explaining actions or conditions
which appear to be racially motivated."); Note, supra note 44, at 658. For a general
overview on how the courts consider the principles of probability, public policy, and
fairness in the allocation of the burden of proof, sea JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON
EvErNcE § 227 (4th ed. 1992) and JOHN WIGMORE, EvIDENcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§§ 2286-88 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed., 1961).
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plaintiff's burden to prove the elements of de facto segregation, that is,
segregative impact and intent. While plaintiffs have the burden of proving
system-wide segregative intent, they are not required to prove such intent as to
each and every student or public school within a system.47
To balance the burdens of proof, the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School
District No. 1,48 held that "where plaintiffs prove that the school authorities
have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial
portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school
system .. . " it creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within
the system is also intentional. 49 Otherwise stated, proof of intentional
segregation in a substantial portion of the school system establishes "a prima
facie case of unlawful segregative [intent] on the part of the school authorities,
and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated
schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative
actions." 50
Once plaintiffs have established their prima facie case, school officials will
not satisfy their burden of proof by merely articulating an "allegedly logical,
racially neutral explanation for their actions." 51 Instead, they must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among
47 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200 ("We have never suggested that plaintiffs in school
desegregation cases must bear the burden of proving the elements of de jure segregation as
to each and every school or each and every student within the school system.").
48 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
4 9 Id. at 201. This presumption, with its corresponding shift in the burden of proof, is
proper according to three principles. First, it is fair because the school officials are in the
best position to articulate the actual factors taken into consideration in its decisions. Public
policy also supports such a shift because it furthers the public interest in completely
removing intentional discrimination and segregation from the public schools-with such a
presumption, school authorities will be less likely to take segregative actions. Furthermore,
the presumption is proper under the principle of probability because, in light of the
segregative impact of such decisions, it is more likely than not that segregative intent was at
least one factor upon which school officials made their decision.50 Id. at 208. In explaining why the school authorities have the burden of proof after
the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the Court reasoned that "it is both fair and
reasonable to require that the school authorities bear the burden of showing that their
actions as to other segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by
segregative intent." Id. at 209 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that, when
intentional segregative actions in a substantial portion of the school system is proven, there
exists a "high probability" that similar impermissible segregative considerations have
motivated their actions in other areas of the system. Id. at 208. For a detailed analysis of the
Keyes' presumption according to the principles of probability, fairness, and public policy,
see Note, supra note 44, at 659-60.
51 Id. at 210.
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"any" of the factors that motivated their actions. 52 In many instances, this shift
in the burden of proof may effectively prevent the school authorities from
raising a defense. As a result, the presumption of system-wide segregative
intent may constitute one of plaintiffs' most powerful evidentiary tools.5 3
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,54 the Supreme Court established other
presumptions in favor of the plaintiff. First, it held that, without taling into
account any disparities in the student assignment, "where it is possible to
identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by reference to the racial
composition of teachers and staff, the quality of the buildings and equipment,
or the organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of segregative intent
is shown. "5 The Fourth Circuit has extended this presumption by holding that,
in a school system with a history of segregation, the discharge of a
disproportionate number of African-American teachers incident to
desegregation "thrust[s] upon the School Board the burden of justifying its
conduct by clear and convincing evidence. "56
Second, the Court stated that schools which are all or predominately of one
race and are located in a district of mixed population require close scrutiny to
determine whether the student attendance assignment has a segregative intent.57
It made clear, though, that "the existence of some small number of one-race, or
virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a
system that still practices segregation by law. "58 However, the Court
maintained that, in a system with a history of segregation, there is a
presumption of a dual school system where the schools are substantially
disproportionate in their racial composition. 59 Once this presumption arises and
52 Id. The Supreme Court has not left the school authorities without any defense. It
stated that it might recognize a "natural boundaries" defense. However, the Court did not
state that it would recognize the "natural boundaries" defense as a valid defense as a matter
of law. Id. at 203 ("This is not to say, of course, that there can never be a case in which the
geographical structure of, or the natural boundaries within, a school district may have the
effect of dividing the district into separate, identifiable and unrelated units."). This issue
remains to be litigated.
53 This is definitely an example of a rule of law that is rooted in public policy. While
this rule of law is not a presumption to "intent," its role is just as important to the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, this same rule of law does not carry over to other areas of racial
discrimination law.
54 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
55 Id. at 18.
56 Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966)
(en banc).
57 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1971).
58 Id. at 26.
59 Id.
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the board has proposed a plan to convert the current system to a unitary school
system, if the plan contemplates the continuation of some schools that are all or
predominately of one race, the school authorities have the burden of proving
that these new school assignments are "genuinely nondiscriminatory." 60
In each case, the plaintiff's burden of proof will be difficult. Establishing a
prima facie case will typically be the plaintiff's main obstacle. Although,
subjective or objective intent may be difficult to prove, establishing a prima
facie case has been made easier through the help of numerous presumptions
which effectively shift the burden of proof onto the defendants, who have the
knowledge to provide the court reasons for their decisions regarding the public
schools.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERDISTRICT DESEGREGATION ORDER-A
NEw AND EXPANDED APPROACH
The Supreme Court, in Green v. County School Board,61 held that school
authorities have an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch."62 This approach to desegregation is proper not
only from a moral perspective, but also in light of the well-settled objective of
remedies-to restore plaintiffs to the position they would have been in but for
the injury.
In the year 1994, as courts are faced with requests for interdistrict
desegregation orders and the application of the Milliken test, it is imperative
that they analyze this two-part test in light of Green's objective to remove
segregation "root and branch." When such an objective remains the focal point
of the remedy, the conservative approach towards desegregation exemplified by
cases of the Reagan-Bush era should begin to unfold and the courts should be
provided with a legal mechanism to expand the circumstances under which
contiguous school districts, which have been effectively exempted from liability
60 Id. The schools which would be predominantly one race after the plan would be
closely scrutinized by the court. The actual burden on the school board would be to prove
that the school's racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action
on their part. Id. This may not have played much importance, in 1970 (only 16 years after
Brown I) because many people on the school board may have been on it during, or even
before, 1954. This line of reasoning would have more importance, however, to a school
board member today because it is highly unlikely that they were also board members during
or prior to 1954 and Brown L
61 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the Court dealt with the issue of whether a freedom-
of-choice program was operated in fact to preserve a dual system.62 Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
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under the conservative approach, can be included in the desegregation order.
Only then can children who have become victims of the dual school system be
compensated appropriately.
Under Milliken v. Bradley,63 federal courts do not have the authority to
grant an interdistrict desegregation order unless it determines two things have
occurred: (1) a school district has violated its students' Fourteenth Amendment
rights; and (2) this violation has had a significant segregative effect on another
school district. 64 As a result, it is important to know what constitutes a
constitutional violation and what constitutes a significant segregative effect.
A. A Fourteenth Amendment Violation: Evidentiary Issues
1. The Current Analysis: Following the Basics
In past racial discrimination cases, plaintiffs have attempted to establish a
constitutional violation by introducing statistical evidence that a
disproportionate number of African Americans have been adversely affected by
a government act or policy. 65 The courts have generally responded that a
showing of disproportionate impact on African Americans from government
acts or policies, taken alone, is insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation.66 In fact, in Washington v. Davis,67 the Supreme Court rejected such
an approach and held that for a government act or policy that is neutral on its
face to violate an individual's constitutional rights, that individual must prove
63 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
64 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
65 These plaintiffs primarily based their arguments upon Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). In ick Wo, the Supreme Court used a disproportional impact analysis to
hold that San Francisco ordinances which vested in the board of supervisors the discretion
to grant or withhold their consent to the use of wooden buildings as laundries, even though
neutral on their face, denied the plaintiff equal protection of the law and violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 368-70. The Court found disproportional impact
because (1) Chinese owned and operated 240 of the 320 laundries with wooden buildings in
the city, and (2) the board had denied the application of all Chinese with wooden buildings
(approximately 200) who had applied for licenses, yet accepted many white owners with
wooden buildings. Id. at 374.
66 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("Our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.").
67 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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that such act or policy had a racially discriminatory "purpose." 68 In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,69 the Supreme
Court further solidified this proposition by holding that plaintiffs, in racial
discrimination cases, must prove some form of discriminatory intent for a
constitutional violation to exist.70
This rule of law also applies to school desegregation cases. 71 In fact, the
requirement of proving intent first arose in the school desegregation arena. In
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 72 the Supreme Court ruled that, in school
desegregation litigation, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant acted with an
"intent" to segregate the school district for defendant's action to constitute a
constitutional violation.73 Numerical disproportions no longer will suffice.
After Davis and Arlington Heights, plaintiffs began to argue that
discriminatory intent should be found where (1) there is a disparate racial
impact from a government agent's actions and (2) such disparate racial impact
68 Id. at 239-45. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the use of a police
recruitment examination even though four times as many African-American applicants
failed the examination than their white counterparts. Justice White, in his opinion, admitted
that a racially disproportionate effect may be evidence of discriminatory intent, however, he
limited it to only when the disproportionate effect is "very difficult to explain on non-racial
grounds." Id. at 242. The Court's analysis is different in a Title VII action. Under Title
VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially
disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be
proved. Plaintiffs must only prove disproportionate impact to show a violation. Id. at 246-
47.
69 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
70 Id. at 264-71.
71 See, e.g., Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (holding
that plaintiffs must establish that the adoption of student assignment policies by the school
board, which had a segregative effect, was racially motivated); see also Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). There has been some debate on whether the
"intent" requirement in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), should be extended into
the area of school desegregation. Compare Martha M. McCarthy, Is a New Standard on
Discrimination Emerging?, 8 J.L. & EDuc. 315, 319 (1978) ("The Supreme Court's
posture in desegregation litigation cannot be divorced from its stance in addressing all types
of discrimination.") with Harold J. Sullivan, The Intent Requirement in Desegregation
Cases: The Inapplicability of Washington v. Davis, 10 J.L. & EDuc. 325, 332 ("Despite the
Supreme Court's reliance on Washington in school desegregation cases following 1976, thus
making a finding of intent a requirement in school desegregation cases, the same standard
should not be applied in school desegregation as in racially disproportionate impact cases.").
72 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In Keyes, the Supreme Court first confronted the issue of
school desegregation when a racial imbalance existed in a northern school system with no
history of statutorily authorized school desegregation, that is, de facto segregation.
73 Id. at 198, 208-10.
[Vol. 55:415
SCHOOL SEGREG4TION
was a foreseeable consequence of the action. 74 In Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick,75 plaintiffs raised this argument to show that the city
school board had violated their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument as well and stated that under the trilogy of Keyes, Davis,
and Arlington Heights, "disparate impact and foreseeable consequences,
without more, do not establish a constitutional violation."76 However, the
Court opined that these two factors are relevant evidence in proving
discriminatory purpose.77 Nevertheless, it still failed to articulate how
segregative intent could be proven.
Segregative "intent" is undoubtedly the primary obstacle for plaintiffs in
school desegregation cases. Proving intent in 1994 will be especially difficult
because most school officials do not and will not openly express that the
purpose of their actions is to resegregate the school system.78 Furthermore, in
light of the ease in holding school officials liable for overt discriminatory
actions after Brown v. Board of Education, today's school officials are more
likely to "mask" their discriminatory intent than school officials did in the
past.79
74 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
75 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
76 Id. at 464.
77 Id. In a school desegregation action the Court held that "[a]dherence to a particular
policy or practice, 'with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon
racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among many others which may be
considered by a court in determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be
drawn."' Id. at 465 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 255
(S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd inpart, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)).78 Thomas M. Dee & Norella V. Huggins, Modelsfor Proving Liability of School and
Housing Officials in School Desegregation Cases, 23 URa. L. ANNUAL 111, 117-18 (1982);
see also United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412 (7th Cir.), on remand,
456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) ("[l]n an age when it is unfashionable for state officials to
openly express racial hostility, direct evidence of overt bigotry will be impossible to find.");
Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37
RUTGERs L. REV. 673, 686 (1985) ("Both at the individual and institutional levels, racism is
typically far more subtle, indirect, and ostensibly nonracial now than it was in 1964, during
the full swing of the Civil Rights Movement. Consequently, detection and remedy have
become more difficult.").
79 Today, government actors, including school board members, disguise their
discriminatory intent by avoiding the creation of a paper trail. Id. Some may argue that
discriminatory motives no longer exist in the decisionmaking by local school boards.
However, Stein stated it correctly when he said that, in light of the recent increase in racial
incidents across the country, "[i]t is unlikely that school boards, which reflect the values of
the community, would not also mirror this prejudice." Stein, supra note 10, at 2005.
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Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has left them with little
guidance as to what "intent" actually means. No test has been established to
remove this uncertainty. In fact, the Supreme Court has openly expressed its
reluctance to define exactly what constitutes intent, that is, the types and
amount of state conduct that establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
When faced with the issue of the necessary level of action for injunctive relief,
Justice Douglas in Keyes wrote that "the necessary degree of state involvement
is incapable of precise definition."80 In light of this belief, the Court held that a
determination of discriminatory intent must be analyzed on a "case-by-case
basis." 81 As a result, there are no per se answers to the questions of what, and
how much, is required to establish a constitutional violation. 82
Although much has been left unanswered regarding discriminatory intent,
one thing is clear: plaintiffs are not required to prove subjective discriminatory
intent. Keyes, Davis, and Arlington Heights required proof of discriminatory
intent, however, they did not require direct proof of "subjective" intent.
Recognizing the difficulty in discovering direct evidence of discriminatory
intent and the impossibility of a school board confessing to charges of
discrimination, the courts have chosen, instead, to analyze school desegregation
cases according to an "objective" standard. 83
Under an "objective" standard, the courts analyze the various acts of the
school board, the state board of education, and the state legislature and infer
discriminatory intent from the "totality of the relevant facts,",84 including both
direct and circumstantial evidence. 85 The courts justify their authority to infer
80 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 215 (1973) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
81 To justify its reluctance to establish what types and how much state conduct are
necessary for a constitutional violation, the Court compared the task to the similar difficulty
with determining the amorphous concepts of due care, causation, preponderance of the
evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt.
82 Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d at 400 ("Arlington Heights, while amplifying the
intent requirement set forth in Davis, did not answer the crucial question of what type of
intent a plaintiff must show in order to make out a prima facie case under the Equal
Protection Clause. In short, Arlington Heights instructed lower courts where to look for the
required intent without defining its imminent nature.").
83 Joseph A. Sullivan, Equal Protection in the Post-Milliken Em: The Future of
Interdistrict Remedies in Desegregating Public Schools, 18 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. Rav.
137, 163 (1986); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) ("Frequently, the
most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor.").
84 Sullivan, supra note 83, at 163.
85 E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977) (asking for a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
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such intent from circumstantial evidence upon the ideology that "the actor is
presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds." 86
Arlington Heights has set forth a number of factors which are relevant in
determining whether segregative intent can be inferred from an act. They
include:
(1) the historical background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series
of official actions taken for invidious purposes; (2) the specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision; (3) departures from the normal
procedural sequence; (4) substantive departures, particularly if the factors
usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision
contrary to the one reached; and (5) the legislative or administrative history of
a decision.87
With these factors in mind, the courts may analyze, independent of each other,
the acts of the local school board, the state board of education, and the state
legislature to determine whether each acted with individual discriminatory
intent or acted with group intent to further segregate inner city public schools.
a. Local School Board as a Defendant
The primary focus of the courts' analyses in school desegregation cases has
been on the local school board. Primarily, courts have focused on local school
boards because a local school board has a wider array of actions and polices
from which the courts are able to infer discriminatory intent. As a result, this
subsection discusses the various indicia that the courts focus upon to establish a
Fourteenth Amendment violation.
of intent as may be available"). In Brown v. Artery Org., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 n.26
(D.D.C. 1987), the court stated that
[iun this day and age, when racial discrimination is no longer fashionable as it
was a generation or two ago [and]... it is now much more difficult to provide
direct or conclusive proof of discriminatory intent ... [t]he law would be as blind
as the mythical figure of justice if it did not take account of that reality, rejecting
the use of circumstantial evidence of intent.
Id.
86 United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
87 Arington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
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The racial composition of a school's student population is probably the
most important and influential indicia of intent. 88 However, statistical evidence
of racial imbalances alone is insufficient to pernit a finding of unconstitutional
segregation. 89 The courts have not established any numerical guidelines to
determine what is, per se, a segregated school. However, a substantial degree
of importance has been placed upon the percentage of African-American
students attending predominately or all African-American schools. 90 Many
courts have used an eighty percent threshhold, that is, how many African-
American students go to a school which has a racial composition of eighty
percent or more African Americans, as an indicator of segregative intent. As a
result, plaintiffs should initially focus on obtaining evidence of the racial
makeup of the student populations at each level of the public school system.
Other indicia of segregative intent which have a close correlation to the
racial makeup of the student population are student assignment plans. Even
though neutral on their face, optional attendance zones may violate the
students' constitutional rights. 9 1  Optional attendance zones are not
88 While the makeup of the student population is indicia of a segregated school system,
pupil reassignments alone do not automatically remedy the past segregative acts. Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,287 (1977).
89 Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 240 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd
in part, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir 1978), aft'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
90 See Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. Ohio 1977), rev'd, 583 F.2d
243 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)
(51 of 69 schools within the school system were at least 90% white or 90% black); Penick,
429 F. Supp. at 229 (At the time this case was decided 70.4% of all students in Columbus
Public Schools attended schools that were 80-100% populated by either African-American
or white students. One-half of the 172 schools were 90% African American or 90% white
when African Americans only constituted 32% of the school system's population.); United
States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aft'd, 474 F.2d 81
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 920 (1973) (School numbers 1, 60, 66, 69, 71, 76 and
110 were over 80% African American.).
91 The courts are most likely to make such a finding in two situations: (1) when the
optional attendance zones allow white students to bypass "African-American" schools,
which are closer in proximity, to go to a "white" school; and (2) when the optional
attendance zone only encompasses an area that the school board knows is undergoing a
racial transition such that it allows the white children in the area to choose the "white"
school and the African-American children to choose the "African-American" school. See,
e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215
(6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Detroit School Board created and maintained
optional attendance zones within Detroit neighborhoods undergoing racial transitions and
between high school attendance areas of opposite predominant racial compositions.);
Penick, 429 F. Supp. at 244-45 (In times of residential racial transition, the board created
optional attendance zones "to allow white students to avoid predominantly black schools,"
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unconstitutional per se, but they receive a high level of scrutiny when they
allow white students to bypass closer "African-American" 92 schools and attend
"white" schools. 93 Likewise, the courts have recognized that busing African
Americans past predominately white schools to attend predominately African-
American schools, and vice-versa, may constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
violation.94 At least one court has declared that even "freedom of choice" 95
and "neighborhood school" 96 attendance policies may be unconstitutional
notwithstanding the fact that they are neutral on their faces.
Indicia of segregative intent can also be found through other statistical
figures and board actions. For example, the courts have utilized the percentage
of African-American teachers assigned to predominately African-American
schools, in contrast to the number in predominately white schools, to bolster its
finding of intent.97 The courts have also closely analyzed the location of new
which were often closer to the homes of the white pupils and where the court could not
perceive a racially neutral purpose of the optional zones.).
92 By "African-American" school, I am referring to schools with a population of at
least 75% African Americans. In the inner city, it is not uncommon for some schools to be
90% or more African American in racial makeup. See Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 582;
Penick, 429 F. Supp. at 229.
93 By "white" school, I am referring to a school in which the racial makeup of the
student population is at least 75% white.
94 See Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 582 (finding Fourteenth Amendment violation when
African-American children were bused past white schools to attend African-American
schools and white children were not bused to attend an African-American school).
95 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding, in light of the school
board's affirmative duty to remove segregation from the school system, that its freedom of
choice attendance formula was unconstitutional because it produced negligible integration;
no whites had chosen to attend the African-American school that 85% of the African
Americans attended).
96 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
97 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (A constitutional
violation was found because the school board had a general practice of assigning African-
American teachers only to schools with predominantly or all African-American students. In
the 1972-73 school year, 250 African-American elementary teachers (63% of all African-
American elementary teachers) were assigned to schools with at least 80% African-
American populations, while the schools with at least 80% white populations had no
African-American teachers assigned to them.); Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32 v. United
States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 1050, and cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1071 (1980) (Along with other actions, the racial composition of the faculty within
Conway county was sufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation: two of the
all-white school districts had no African-American teachers, one of the all-white school
districts only had one African-American teacher, and the all-African-American school
district had only one white teacher.).
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school construction sites,98 the method of drawing school attendance zones, 99
and the amount of subsidies applied towards the transportation of students to
outlying private and parochial schools. 100
The courts have not limited their analysis of intent to merely affirmative
actions by the school board. A school board may also be held to have violated
students' constitutional rights as a result of its inaction.101 Such a finding is
most likely to result when the school board has been put on notice that either
the board's current decision will increase the racial imbalance in the school
system, and the board fails to reverse its decision, or that a recommendation
will eliminate or lessen the current segregation, and the board refuses to
implement that recommendation.
In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,102 the Supreme Court imposed
liability on a school board for its inaction. The Court affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the Columbus School Board violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by failing to act upon various
recommendations of community groups, recommendations which, if
implemented, would have decreased the level of segregation within the school
system.' 0 3 The school board's inaction included (1) failing to implement
recommendations of the University Commission of 1968 to encourage
integrated residential patterns, (2) refusing to create a site-selection advisory
group to assist in avoiding construction sites with a segregative effect, (3)
refusing to ask state education officials to present plans for desegregating the
Columbus public schools, and (4) refusing to apply for federal desegregation-
assistance funds. 104 While the Court did not expressly state such, it may be
inferred from the opinion that school boards have a duty to implement plans
and recommendations which would have the effect of lessening the racial
disparities within the school system; failure to do so, in the absence of valid
98 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aft'd, 423 U.S. 963
(1975) (finding violation of Constitution because State subsidized interdistrict transportation
of white inner city children to the suburban private and parochial schools, which were
approximately 94% white).
101 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
102 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
103 Id. at 463 n.12.
104 Id. The district court drew "the inference of segregative intent from the Columbus
defendants' failures, after notice, to consider predictable racial consequences of their acts
and omissions when alternatives were available which would have eliminated or lessened
racial imbalance." Id. (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp 229, 240
(S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd inpart, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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race-neutral rationale, legitimizes a finding of segregative intent and should
result in liability.
b. State Board of Education and State Legislature as Defendants
Besides analyzing the acts, policies, and practices of the local school board,
the courts also scrutinize the actions of the state board of education and the
state legislature itself. While the number of their acts which may constitute
constitutional violations may not come close to those of a school board, such
acts may be of greater weight and importance. In fact, in many instances, the
actions or inactions of these defendants alone may be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case and justify an interdistrict award. 105
The state board of education has the responsibility of overseeing the
provision of public education. One of its primary responsibilities is to create
and maintain the various school district lines. The state board may violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to perform its responsibility in accordance
with the Constitution. Whether creating or adjusting school district lines or
consolidating smaller school districts into "mega" districts, the state board of
education will violate its students' Fourteenth Amendment rights if it creates or
adjusts a district on a racial basis and it results in an increased segregative
effect. 106
Even though the state legislature, in theory, does not have any direct
authority over the provision of public education, it still may be found guilty of
violating students' Fourteenth Amendment rights. The courts have held that the
repeal of legislation which negatively affects the ability to desegregate the
school systems may establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The primary
avenue to hold the state legislature liable is to look at the legislation's statutory
history along with the timing of its enactment or repeal.
The prime examples of legislation from which segregative intent can be
inferred are state and local annexation laws. Until 1954, many states had
legislation which either permitted city school districts to annex any land which
the city had annexed for governmental purposes or provided that the territory
automatically became a part of the city school district upon its annexation by
105 See infira notes 111-12.
106 See, e.g., Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 1050, and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980) (A finding
of purposeful segregation of the consolidated school districts of Conway County, Arkansas,
was warranted, although the laws allowing the consolidation were racially neutral on their
face, because the state board's pattern of consolidation showed that various white school
districts, which should have been consolidated with neighboring African-American school
districts, were being consolidated with other white school districts.).
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the city government.10 7 However, as a direct response to Brown v. Board of
Education,10 8 various states either repealed their statutes entirely 0 9 or
amended them to remove the automatic annexation provisions.' 0
Were such actions discriminatorily motivated? The mere fact that the
legislature enacted or repealed annexation statutes soon after the Brown
decision should raise a presumption that such action was discriminatorily
motivated. The state will undoubtedly express that they had a race-neutral
purpose for enacting or repealing. What nondiscriminatory purpose would the
state have? Even if such a purpose was given, a question still arises concerning
the timing. Why didn't the enactment, repeal or amendment occur, for
example, during the 1920s or 30s instead of immediately after Brown?
Considering the degree of racism which permeated the United States during the
1950s and 1960s, the continued struggle of many whites to resist integration of
the public schools, and the timing of the legislative action, it seems more likely
than not that such actions were made with a segregative intent. As a result,
under the principle of probability, annexation statutes which were enacted,
repealed or amended soon after the Brown decision should raise a presumption
of discriminatory intent. When such a presumption arises, the burden should
then shift to the legislature to produce a race-neutral basis for its
decisionmaking.
In United States v. Board of School Commissioners, the Seventh Circuit
was faced with this very issue. After examining the history of the Indianapolis
public school system, the appellate court held that the Indiana legislature's
enactment of the "Uni-Gov" legislation,"' which expanded the city boundaries
107 See, e.g., OmIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3311.06 (C)(1)-(2) (Anderson Supp. 1993);
Act March 8, 1961, ch. 186, § 9, 1961 Ind. Acts 431, 439-42, repealed by Act of February
25, 1969, ch. 52, § 2, 1969 Ind. Acts 57.
108 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cent.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
110 See, e.g., In re Proposed Annexation by Columbus City Sch. Dist., 341 N.E.2d
589, 591 (Ohio 1976). After the 1955 amendment of O.R.C. § 3311.06, the land annexed
by the city is no longer automatically annexed to the city school system. The city school
system currently must apply for annexation from the state school board. With the increased
resistance from the outlying suburban areas, the Columbus city school system has not been
able to expand with the city itself.
III Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 173, § 101, 1969 Ind. Acts 357 (codified as IND.
CODE §§ 18-4-1-1 to 18-4-1-4 (1976)). The "Uni-Gov" legislation is officially titled
"Consolidated First-Class Cities and Counties Act." Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d at
1107. Under the legislation, the city of Indianapolis established a county-wide governmental
structure run by a new governmental unit known as the "City of Indianapolis," which
included all of Marion County. Id. All the residents of the new city now voted in the
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to the county line, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Uni-Gov
legislation repealed a 1961 act which permitted the Indianapolis public school
system to annex any land that the city had annexed for governmental
purposes.' 12 The court reasoned that the Uni-Gov legislation repealed the 1961
act with the racially discriminatory intent and purpose of confining African-
American students in the Indianapolis public schools to the 1969 boundaries of
the system, and thereby perpetuated the segregated white schools in the
adjacent suburban Marion County. 113 As a result, this opinion lays further
foundation for the proposition that legislation which either prevents automatic
annexation or effectively prohibits the inner city school districts from annexing
suburban areas already annexed by the city, should establish a rebuttable
presumption of discriminatory intent, that is, a prima facie case for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation.
c. How Many Acts Are Required for a Constitutional Violation?
In addition to the uncertainty about what does and does not constitute
intent, the lower federal courts have been given little guidance as to the number
of acts necessary to constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The
Supreme Court has failed to establish a bright line test to determine how many
acts are required to establish intent and create a right to relief. The question
remains whether a single act is sufficient to constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
violation.
Theoretically, a single action by a government defendant may be sufficient
to establish a constitutional violation. Under Green v. County School Board,
each school district has an affirmative duty to "take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system."" 4 The Supreme Court, in Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick, further established that "[e]ach instance of a
election for mayor and members of the new City Council. Id. Under the Uni-Gov
legislation, the new City Council had authority over nearly every governmental area except
school education. As a result, the Uni-Gov legislation had intentionally repealed a 1961 act
which allowed the school district to annex land which had been civilly annexed to the city.
Id. at 1107-08; see Act of March 8, 1961, ch. 186, § 9, 1961 Ind. Acts 431, 439-42,
repealed by, Act of February 25, 1969, ch. 52, § 2, 1969 Ind. Acts 57 (codified as IND.
CODE § 20-3-14-11 (1976)). The court believed that the state legislature repealed the 1961
Act with a discriminatory purpose because it knew that the suburban areas would oppose the
consolidation of its school systems with the inner city school system, thus encouraging the
segregation of the school systems. Board of Sch. Comm'rs., 637 F.2d at 1108.
112 Board of Sch. Comm'rs., 637 F.2d at 1108.
113 id.
114 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."115 From this language, it follows that once plaintiffs
have established that the school board has a duty to desegregate the school
system, any action by the school board that is intended to, and actually does,
further segregate the school system may provide a sufficient basis to establish a
constitutional violation and require a desegregation order.
Milliken v. Bradley may provide additional support for this approach.
While discussing the controlling principle in granting injunctive relief, the
Supreme Court intimated that a Fourteenth Amendment violation "might" be
found where the school district lines have been drawn on the basis of race in a
way as to maximize its segregative effect. 116 Such language suggests that only
one act is necessary to establish a constitutional violation. However, the degree
of reliance on this proposition is unclear because it is merely dicta rather than a
conclusion as a matter of law.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Board of School
Commissioners lends further support to the single-action theory. In this
Indianapolis case, the court held that the enactment of a series of state
legislation, in addition to Uni-Gov, had a segregative effect which was
significant enough to justify an interdistrict desegregation order. 117 As a
corollary, the mere enactment or repeal of legislation that intentionally
segregates the school systems should, in and of itself, be sufficient to establish
a prima facie case of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. It is a natural
consequence that when a single act is sufficient to justify an interdistrict
remedy, that same act is also sufficient, in and of itself, to establish a prima
facie case of a constitutional violation.
In reality, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will allow such an
expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the current Court's
conservative approach in interpreting the Constitution, it is more likely to
require a series of actions to establish a constitutional violation. In fact, to date,
each Supreme Court desegregation case has involved a series of actions by the
local school board,118 some in connection with actions by the state board of
115 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979).
116 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) ("[A]n interdistrict remedy might
be in order where... district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In
such [a] circumstance[] an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the
interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation.").
117 United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 408 (7th Cir.), on remand, 456 F.
Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), affd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
118 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979);
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education, others in addition to actions by the state legislature.1 19 As a result,
plaintiffs should be prepared to introduce evidence of multiple segregative
actions by the defendants.
2. Housing Discrimination-Its Inclusion into the Elite Group of
Admissible Evidence
In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court's majority opinion left open for
debate whether the federal courts may rely on evidence of housing
discrimination to infer discriminatory intent and to establish a Fourteenth
Amendment violation.120 In his concurring opinion, though, Justice Stewart,
suggested that intentional government housing violations may be sufficient to
segregative intent and to justify a school desegregation order. 121 As a result,
legal scholars are divided as to the importance of Stewart's dictum 122 and the
courts are uncertain as to the relevance of such evidence.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484
(1972); Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968); School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987); Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
838 (1980); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 454 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ohio 1978),
af'd, 675 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1982).
119 See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. 717; Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101.
120 Milliken, 418 U.S. 717. The district court had found housing violations by state
officials and, partially based upon such finding, concluded that the students' constitutional
rights had been violated. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (E.D. Mich.
1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In affirming the
district court's judgment, the court of appeals stated that "we have not relied at all upon
testimony pertaining to segregated housing except as school construction programs helped
cause or maintain such segregation." Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In light of this fact, the majority of the Supreme Court
stated that "[a]ccordingly, in its present posture, the case does not present any question
concerning possible state housing violations." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 728 n.7.
121 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Were it to be shown ... that
state officials had contributed to the separation of the races.., by purposeful, racially
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, . .. transfer of pupils across district
lines or... restructuring of district lines might well be appropriate.").
122 Harding, supra note 17, at 342-43 ("Though some believe that Justice Stewart's
words might provide an independent basis for relief, others take the suggestion as merely an
'offhand remark."').
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Various authors123 have suggested and many courts124 have acknowledged
that a close interrelationship exists between residential housing practices and
the racial makeup of the city schools. In many instances, discriminatory
residential housing practices may be the primary cause in further segregation of
a school system. Likewise, placement of schools in areas of predominately one
race may be the primary cause of residential segregation by others, the purpose
of which is to promote and maintain one-race schools. Even though "school
and housing desegregation law have evolved along separate lines," 125 the two
legal concepts may be merged to hold school officials responsible for
remedying housing discrimination through school desegregation orders. 126
School officials will undoubtedly argue that they should not be delegated
the responsibility for remedying private residential discrimination or even
discriminatory practices by other government agencies because there is no
123 See Harding, supra note 17, at 340 ("Official housing discrimination should serve
as a basis for metropolitan school desegregation remedies even if plaintiffs offer no proof of
discrimination by school officials."); Karl E. Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on
Housing and School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. Rnv. 833, 842-43 (1975) (noting racial
composition of a school's student body may act as a signal to realtors and homebuyers
because school attendance lines are an important factor in residential real estate). But see
Eleanor P. Wolf, Northern School Desegregation and Residential Choice, 1977 Sup. Cr.
REv. 63, 66 (1977) (indicating a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude that the racial
composition of the schools has an effect upon residential patterns in the community).
124 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973)
(designating schools as one-race schools may have a profound reciprocal effect upon the
racial compositions of residential neighborhoods within the city); Swanm v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) ("The location of schools may thus
influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have [an]
important impact on [the] composition of inner-city neighborhoods."); Adams v. United
States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980) (noting that the
public perception of a school's racial identity is an influential factor in shaping community
residential patterns); United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 408 (7th
Cir.), on remand, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 637
F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) ("It is generally agreed that racial
residential patterns are reflected in the student composition of an area's public schools and
that racial segregation in public schools and racial segregation in housing are integrally
interrelated.").
125 Dee & Huggins, supra note 78, at 112-13.
126 See generally, Dee & Huggins, supra note 78 (analyzing five liability models that
appear in school desegregation cases from which a school board can be held liable to
remedy housing discrimination through a desegregation order).
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correlation between the constitutional violation and the remedy. 127
Accordingly, school officials will suggest that they should be held responsible
only for remedying segregation in the school system which is a direct result of
their intentional discriminatory acts. However, language in Milliken suggests
otherwise128 and supports this housing approach to liability.
Plaintiffs cannot rely on the theories of agency or vicarious liability to hold
a school district liable for discriminatory acts of real estate agents. In Milliken,
plaintiffs relied on these theories to assert that the state school board was
responsible and liable for the constitutional violations of the Detroit school
board. Because acceptance of these theories of liability would justify a
statewide remedy, thereby violating the rule of equity that a remedy cannot
exceed the extent of the violation, the Supreme Court rejected these theories of
liability. 129 Plaintiffs, however, may still be able to require local school boards
to remedy housing discrimination under either the "single-sovereign
assumption" 130 theory or the tort "concert of action" theory.
Under the single-sovereign assumption theory, when an arm of the state
stands accused of a constitutional violation, the state itself also stands
accused. 131 In other words, the state cannot escape liability by simply
127 Under Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature of the constitutional violation. As a
result, there must be some nexus between the equitable remedy and the violation.128 Milliken recognized that an "innocent" suburban school district, one which has not
committed a constitutional violation, may be held partially responsible for remedying
intentional segregation in the city school district. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745
(1974). In this situation, the suburban school district is held liable for the discriminatory acts
of another school district, even though there is no nexus between the violation and the
remedy, because they are both agents of the education branch of the state government. This
same rationale is sufficient to hold a school district partially responsible for remedying
residential discrimination which has an effect on the school district's racial composition
because the school district and the constitutional violators are both agents of the state
government. As a result, Milliken itself provides great support for the housing approach to
hold school districts liable. See Harding, supra note 17, at 344-45.129 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738, 744-46.
130 The courts have already applied the "single-sovereign assumption" theory in
parallel actions to hold that the constitution protects other rights, besides equal education,
from state action. See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394 (1970) (evoking single-
sovereign assumption to protect defendant's constitutional right against double-jeopardy by
barring prosecution in state court after prosecution in municipal court because both are arms
of the same government); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293, 296-97
(1969) (using single-sovereign assumption to strike down an otherwise valid and neutrally
administered literacy test for voter registration to remedy the wrongs of the dual school
system).
131 Harding, supra note 17, at 346.
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fragmenting responsibility among its various branches. 132 Because the state is
ultimately responsible for the acts of its government agents, including
constitutional violations, the courts should be able to utilize any of the state
government's branches that have the capability and resources to remedy the
wrong and place the injured party in the position they would have been in but
for the wrong.
Under the single-sovereign assumption theory, in the context of housing
discrimination, the court should have the authority to hold the state partially
responsible for remedying residential segregation caused by housing officials
through any means available to it. Because the local school board is an agent of
the state, and the state is liable for the wrong, the court should have the
discretion to require this agent to help, through school desegregation orders,
implement a remedy designed to remove the effects of the housing
discrimination "root and branch."
The use of the single-sovereign assumption theory is not a novel idea in the
area of school desegregation. The Supreme Court, in fact, has already applied
the concept to resolve disputes in recent years. For example, in Cooper v.
Aaron,133 the Court relied upon the single-sovereign assumption theory to
prevent the Little Rock school board from delaying the desegregation of the
school district. The local school board had claimed it was delaying the
desegregation of their schools because the governor and the state legislature
were preventing the implementation of court-ordered desegregation plans. 134
The Court rejected the argument, however, and held that for equal protection
purposes a local school board is an arm of the state, and that when it violates
the Fourteenth Amendment, the state itself also violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. 135
132 See United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir.), on
remand, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) ("The commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed
at the state and cannot be avoided by a fragmentation of responsibility among various
agents."); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 183 (W.D. Mich. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (indicating state "should not be allowed to escape
constitutional responsibility by fractionalizing its jurisdiction through many agencies");
United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739, 748 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (A state "cannot escape
responsiility for the racial discrimination disclosed in this case or the obligation to correct
the effects of such discrimination by neatly compartmentalizing the authority and
responsibility of its various instrumentalities . .
133 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
134 Id. at 15-17.
135 In support of its position, the court reasoned as follows:
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized the single-
sovereign assumption theory. In United States v. Board of School
Commissioners,136 the city's racial composition was similar to that of most
large metropolitan areas: 98.5% of the African Americans in Marion County
lived in the "old" city, the area served by the Indianapolis public schools (the
inner city public school system), while the majority of the whites lived in the
outlying suburban areas. This racial division in residential areas was clearly
reflected in the Indianapolis public school system.1 37 After accepting the
district court's findings of residential segregation, 138 the court held that the
"innocent" suburban school districts may be held partially responsible for
remedying these wrongs. 139 In response to the suburban school districts'
The command of the Fourteenth Amendment is that no "State" shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.. .. "The constitutional
provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents
by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State
government, ... denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws violates the
constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with
the State's power, his act is that of the State."
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16-17 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880)).
136 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), on remand, 436 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind 1978), aff'd in
part, vacated inpart, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 338 (1980).
137 During the 1968-69 academic year, 96.8 % of all African-American students within
Marion County attended schools served by Indianapolis public schools. Id. at 408. In the
1976-77 school year, African Americans accounted for less than 2% of the school
population in 7 of the 10 suburban Marion County districts. Id. Indianapolis public schools,
1 of 11 school districts in Marion County, serviced 52% of all students in Marion County
public schools, but over 90% of the African Americans. Id.
138 The appellate court remanded the case back to the district court to specify if the
state had committed any practices of housing discrimination, and, if so, what portion
resulted in segregative residential patterns. Id. at 410. The court felt this was necessary to
determine whether an interdistrict remedy was appropriate and to fashion an appropriate
remedy. Id. This remand was required by Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977). Under Brinknan, the district court must first determine how much
incremental effect the violations had on the racial imbalance in the school system.
139 The court stated as follows:
[t]he suburban school officials may not maintain that their districts must be excluded
from any interdistrict remedy because they may be innocent of committing any
constitutional violations, and they should not be held responsible for the acts of state




arguments that they should not be held liable for the wrongful acts of the local
housing authority or zoning board, the court cited Cooper v. Aaron140 and held
as follows:
The commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the state and
cannot be avoided by a fragmentation of responsibility among various agents.
If the state has contributed to the separation of the races, it has the obligation to
remedy the constitutional violations. That remedy may include school districts
which are its instrumentalities and which are the product of the violation.
Thus, if state discriminatory housing practices have a substantial interdistrict
effect, it is appropriate to require school authorities to remedy the effects even
though they did not themselves cause this aspect of school desegregation. 141
As a result, under the single-sovereign assumption theory, both the city public
school system and suburban school systems may be held responsible for
correcting the wrongful effects of state housing discrimination.
The single-sovereign assumption theory is a valid tool to remedy
constitutional wrongs because it comports with the traditional principles of
equity. The scope of the remedy, following this approach, does not exceed the
extent of the constitutional violation. In contrast to the agency and vicarious
liability theories, 142 the single-sovereign assumption theory does not allow the
equitable remedy to exceed the "geographical area of operation of the housing
authority or other governmental entity found guilty of [the] constitutional
violations." 143 Furthermore, the scope of the remedy is limited to the extent
that the housing discrimination is a cause of school segregation. 144
An alternative method of holding school districts responsible for correcting
the wrongs of residential segregation may be the tort concert of action theory.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d at 410.
140 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
141 Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d at 410 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
142 The agency and vicarious liability theories for third party liability were rejected by
the Supreme Court because they violated this principle. Under both theories, a violation by
a local school board would have been sufficient to justify a state-wide desegregation
remedy. See supra text accompanying note 129.
143 Harding, supra note 17, at 347.
144 Id. As in all cases, plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the
unconstitutional actions or policies of state housing officials and the racial composition of
the school districts intended to be remedied. This requirement of a causal connection allows
the single-sovereign assumption theory to comport with Dayton Board of Education v.
Br&inan, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). In Brinklnan, the Court found that courts only have
discretion to remedy the "incremental segregative effect." Id. at 531-32. For a discussion of
the requirement of causal connection, see Harding, supra note 17, at 348-53.
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The concert of action theory imposes liability on a third party for the tortious
conduct of another.145 According to Prosser, the concert of action theory
applies to:
[a]ll those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious
act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend
aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for
their benefit, are equally liable with him.... Express agreement is not
necessary, and all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding .... 146
Even though the concert of action theory has been applied in tort litigation,
its rationale of distributing liability to all parties who have benefited from the
wrongful acts should also apply to school desegregation cases. 147 Chief Justice
Burger's language in Milliken supports such an extension of the law. 148 In
essence, under the concert of action theory, the courts should have the
authority to hold school districts that have "benefitted" from residential
segregation partially liable for remedying the constitutional violation through
interdistrict school desegregation orders.
The opinions in Board of School Commissioners149 and Evans v.
Buchanan150 seem to have applied the concert of action theory to order a
metropolitan-wide remedy. In both cases, the district court found
discriminatory housing practices that had a direct effect upon the racial
compositions of the city and suburban school districts. In Evans, the court
145 For a detailed discussion of the concert of action theory, see Note, Industry-Wide
Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 980 (1979).
146 W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at
323 (5th ed. 1984). The concert of action theory requires a finding of three elements: a
common design or a conspiracy, an action(s) which aids or encourages the wrongdoer, and
the knowledge that his action or encouragement will result in a breach of duty.
RESTATENmNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
147 See James A. Kushner & Frances E. Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After
Milliken v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH. U. L. REv.
187, 208-15 (1975); Kevin J. Smith, Federal Housing and School Desegregation:
Interdistrict Remedies Without Busing, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 575, 596 (1981).
148 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that even a school district that
had not committed a constitutional violation, but had been significantly affected by the
violation, may be held liable for the violation. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45
(1974). In essence, this is the concert of action theory. A third party school district that has
adopted the acts of the wrongdoer (the inner city school district) for its own benefit (to have
an all-white school district) is held liable for the acts of the wrongdoer.
149 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), on remand, 456 F. Supp 83 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd in
pait, vacated inpat, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 338 (1980).
150 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aft'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
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relied on a history of residential discrimination by both state and federal
housing authorities,151 which were designed to create all-white suburban areas,
to include the suburban school districts that benefitted from those
discriminatory practices in the school desegregation order.152 In the Board of
School Commissioners case, the court relied upon the practice of placing public
housing solely within the Indianapolis public school system, when the housing
authority also had the power to locate public housing units in the neighboring
suburban areas, to hold the suburban school districts liable for remedying the
effects of residential discrimination in the school system. 153
The concert of action theory will be used primarily to hold the suburban
school districts liable. However, it may be applied by the court only if it
recognizes that the development of the suburban area and its racial composition
has been influenced by racially motivated policies and practices of federal,
state, and local housing authorities in connection with private real estate
developers and agents. As the court found in Liddel v. Board of Education,154
151 Among the discriminatory practices were the following: (1) the 1936 Federal
Housing Administration mortgage underwriting manual, which continued in use until 1949,
advocating racially and economically homogeneous neighborhoods; (2) the Delaware Real
Estate Commission, a state licensing agency, publishing the Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards which denounced the introduction of "member of any
race or nationality, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to
property values in that neighborhood;" (3) the Multi-List established by the Greater
Wilmington Board of Realtors, which listed as "open" those listings in which the owner was
willing to sell to a minority buyer, indicated that 51% of all new listings in the City of
Wilmington were open, but only 7 % of new listings in the suburbs were open; (4) operation
of over 2000 public housing units by the Wilmington Housing Authority within the city of
Wilmington and fewer than 40 of such units in the suburbs; and (5) refusal of suburban
governments to grant the necessary zoning or site approval to the County Housing Authority
to establish public housing. Evans, 393 F. Supp. at 434-35.
152 Id. at 438 ("[W]e nevertheless conclude that governmental authorities are
responsible to a significant degree for the increasing disparity in residential and school
populations between Wilmington and its suburbs in the past two decades. This conduct
constitutes segregative action with inter-district effects under Milliken.").
153 United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), on remand, 456
F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 631 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 338 (1980).
154 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Adams v.
United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826, on remand, 491 F.
Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1980). This court decision slightly varies from traditional school
desegregation cases. In addition to the traditional desegregation order, the court also
attempted to balance the racial composition between the city and the suburban school




evidence of a history of housing segregation can be found in the use of
restrictive covenants, racial steering by real estate developers and brokers, site
selection of public housing, zoning laws, and discriminatory use of federal
housing assistance monies. Together, these discriminatory practices effectively
exclude African Americans and other people of color from the suburban areas
and reinforce segregation within city and suburban school districts. 155
Even though the single-sovereign assumption and the concert of action
theories provide plaintiffs with arguments to hold school districts liable for the
residential housing practices within their attendance lines, they are insufficient
in and of themselves to justify a metropolitan-wide or an interdistrict
desegregation order. To have the discretion to grant such an order, the courts
must closely analyze the facts to find evidence sufficient to satisfy the second
element of Milliken's two-part test.
B. "Significant" Segregative Effect-What Does It Take?
After plaintiffs have established that the intentional acts of government
officials have caused a segregative effect upon their school system, they are
entitled to a recovery. However, the court's authority to grant a desegregation
order is limited to one which is intradistrict in scope.156 Only upon a showing
that the intentional acts of the government officials had a "significant
segregative effect" on another public school system may the court grant a
metropolitan-wide or an interdistrict remedy. 157
The courts have recognized that various acts by state officials, including
local school boards, in one school district may have a segregative effect. In
Keyes v. School District No. 1, the Supreme Court explained that the practice
of concentrating African-American students in certain schools has a reciprocal
effect of keeping other nearby schools predominately white. 158 The Court also
held that the practice of constructing new schools of a certain size at a certain
location, with conscious knowledge of the racial impact, has a substantial
reciprocal effect on the racial composition of other nearby schools. 159 From the
foregoing, it is clear that practices which tend to keep the racial composition of
the inner city and its public schools primarily African American also have the
reciprocal effect of allowing the racial composition of the suburban areas and
their school districts to remain predominately white in population.
155 See Smith, supra note 147, at 597.
156 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.




The difficulty in obtaining an interdistrict remedy is not proving a
reciprocal discriminatory effect. Instead, the difficulty lies in proving that such
discriminatory effect was "significant."
Significant segregative effect-What is it? What does it take? Similar to its
approach with segregative intent, the Supreme Court has provided the lower
courts with little, if any, idea of what constitutes a significant segregative
effect. In an attempt to give a cursory explanation of the concept, the Supreme
Court in Milliken stated that "it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts
of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation." 16° However, this explanation
provides as little guidance as the original concept itself.
The common interpretations of each adjective, likewise, do little for civil
rights practitioners. According to Webster, significant is defined as
"meaningful" or "important"; substantial means "material," "considerable," or
"of an essential character." 161 Black's Law Dictionary fails to define
significant and defines substantial as merely "of real worth or importance." 162
As a result, plaintiffs are left analyzing the facts of cases to establish a rough
estimate of what numerical figures may or may not constitute a significant or a
substantial segregative effect.
The facts in two cases provide examples of what does not constitute a
significant segregative effect. The court of appeals in Milliken found evidence
in the record that during the 1957-58 school year the Detroit school system had
contracted with a suburban school district to educate the suburb's African-
American high school students. 163 However, the Supreme Court believed that
the effect of busing these African-American high school students was not
substantial, but de minimis. 164 In a Fifth Circuit case, the court held that the
interdistrict transfer of eleven African-American children was not significant
enough to justify the inclusion of the suburban school district in the remedy. 165
160 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (emphasis added).
161 WEBstER's II NEW RivESDE DicrioNARY 643, 686 (3rd ed. 1984).
162 BLAcK's LAw DiCIONARY 1428 (6th ed. 1990).
163 Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 231 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
The suburban African-American high school students were bused away from nearby white
suburban high schools, past Detroit all-white high schools, to the Detroit African-American
high schools.
164 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 749-50 (finding that this "isolated instance" involving the
two school districts was not significant enough to justify a metropolitan-wide desegregation
order).
165 Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010, 1015 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed sub
nom. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas N.A.A.C.P., 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
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In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has provided some guidance as to what
figure may constitute a significant segregative effect. In United States v. Board
of School Commissioners, the court held that the segregative housing of
5000166 people of color caused a significant segregative effect in the suburban
school district. 167 However, this case does not establish that when an act causes
5000 African-American students to be prevented from attending a suburban all-
white school district an interdistrict remedy is proper as a matter of law.
Instead, determining what figures do and do not constitute a "significant" effect
lies within the discretion of the individual trial judge.
Although numerical figures would be helpful, most courts have not utilized
such an approach to find a substantial effect. Instead, the trend has been for
courts to look at various acts and make a factual determination as to whether
the act would, theoretically, have a significant segregative effect. For example,
the Supreme Court in Milliken stated that a significant segregative effect may
exist where the state has deliberately drawn school district lines on the basis of
race. 168 Other courts have also held that a significant segregative effect existed
when an African-American school district was not consolidated with
neighboring white school districts169 or when state law prevents an inner city
school district, which is predominately African American, from being
consolidated with other school districts. 170
In light of the metamorphosis of de jure discrimination into de facto
discrimination and the fact that school boards now know not to act as the
defendants did in prior cases, it is doubtful that school boards or other state
defendants will act in such an openly discriminatory fashion. As a result,
plaintiffs will likely be forced to look to other facts to establish a significant
segregative effect.
Even though the use of housing discrimination has not been sanctioned by
the Supreme Court as relevant evidence of segregative intent, a finding of
housing discrimination by federal, state, and/or local housing authorities in and
of itself may constitute a significant segregative effect. In Evans and Board of
166 506 F. Supp. 657, 664 (S.D. Ind. 1979), affd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d
1101, 1109-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
167 United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
168 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,745 (1974).
169 See Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 1050, and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980) (indicating
interdistrict relief is properly ordered when one district was almost entirely African
American and included territory that would have been properly consolidated with the
surrounding school districts were it not for racial considerations).
170 See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), af'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
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School Commissioners, the courts held that various housing discrimination
violations by various parties were sufficient to provide a basis for granting
interdistrict desegregation orders. 171 The court in Evans noted that the housing
authority had constructed over 2000 public housing units within the city limits,
but less than 40 units in the outlying suburban areas.172 However, this opinion
cannot be interpreted to mean that such a great disparity in treatment is a
prerequisite to a finding of a significant interdistrict effect.
Finally, there is precedent for the argument that the enactment or repeal of
legislation by the state legislature which effectively increases segregation within
a school district may be sufficient, in and of itself, to find a significant
segregative effect. In the Board of School Commissioners case, the Seventh
Circuit held that "the enactment of UniGov and its companion legislation...
may provide a basis for implementing interdistrict relief."1 73 Because this
language is permissive, it does not create a significant segregative effect as a
matter of law. However, such an approach is consistent with the courts'
reluctance to create rules of law in the context of school desegregation.
V. CONCLUSION
In the year 1994, African-American students are finding themselves void of
the promises of Brown. When coupled with the conservative approach of the
Supreme Court, plaintiffs may find themselves without a viable remedy to
compensate them for the harm they have incurred. In many instances, the
vestiges of state-imposed segregation cannot be eliminated root and branch with
a single-district remedy. As a result, plaintiffs will not be able to be restored to
the position they were in prior to the constitutional violation in the absence of
an interdistrict or metropolitan-wide remedy.
Milliken established the two-part test for granting interdistrict or
metropolitan-wide remedies. However, with its insistence on evidence of
segregative purpose or intent, the Supreme Court may have effectively
immunized state officials from liability. Plaintiffs have been provided with a
few examples of what the courts believe are indicia of segregative intent. To
171 United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir.), ceit.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) ("We hold that... state discriminatory housing practices may
provide a basis for implementing interdistrict relief .... "); Evans, 393 F. Supp. at 438
(When "governmental authorities are responsible to a significant degree for the increasing
disparity in residential and school populations between W'tilmington and its suburbs in the
past two decades ... their conduct constitutes segregative action with inter-district effects
under Milliken.").
172 Evans, 393 F. Supp. at 435.
173 Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d at 410.
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further complicate litigation, the courts are split as to whether to allow the
introduction of evidence of housing discrimination. Housing discrimination as
evidence of segregative intent could be the panacea for plaintiffs in school
desegregation actions. Unfortunately, the future of the housing approach to
recovery is uncertain because the Supreme Court has not addressed the
appropriateness of this line of evidence.
Likewise, the future is uncertain as to what will constitute a significant or
substantial segregative effect. Is the primary focus to be on numerical figures or
may it be presumed from the discriminatory degree of the defendant's conduct?
While the future is uncertain with respect to many issues in school
desegregation cases, such uncertainty also provides hope. This uncertainty also
provides creative plaintiffs with the possibility of trailblazing in areas not
previously explored. As a result, we should all look at school desegregation
law as an opportunity to create history and case law rather than merely reading
it.

